Perception and al-Qaeda's "October Surprise"

Recently, The New York Sun cited top intelligence officials warning of al-Qaeda terrorist operations planned for October in hopes of influencing the US election. Whether or not these attacks materialize, it is worth pondering what al-Qaeda's read is of the political climate in the United States. In other words, how does al-Qaeda understand the American political landscape, and how do they hope to alter it through further terrorist attacks?

Ultimately, the real issue here is one of perceptions, and how they influence al-Qaeda's strategic planning cycle. Our preconceptions burden our thought processes at every stage of analysis, and the not-so-friendly folks at al-Qaeda's headquarters are no different. Prior statements from the terrorist organization indicate that they have a rudimentary understanding of American politics, and the recent death of Adam Gadahn (a.k.a. Azzam al-Amriki) is unlikely to have improved the situation. The grandiose nature of al-Qaeda's demands on America (such as converting to Islam) diminish their utility in understanding al-Qaeda's strategic calculus. However, one can reduce the possibilities (broadly speaking) to two:

1. Al-Qaeda wishes to pursue the old Comintern strategy, wherein any action that worsens the geopolitical situation is itself valuable. Under this rubric, one might plausibly argue that al-Qaeda prefers a McCain victory in November, as he would be most likely to pursue the war with greater vigor. In short, al-Qaeda attacks, and the McCain administration's counter-strikes, serve only to further global de-stabilization and thereby lead to al-Qaeda's ultimate victory.
2. Al-Qaeda regards the US electorate as war-weary and fearful of further casualties. Therefore, terrorist attacks serve to further depress the American voting public and will encourage them to vote for Obama, the candidate who has argued most passionately for a US withdrawal from Iraq. This attitude is certainly reflected in previous statements by bin-Laden, such as his communique of September 8, 2007 in which he stated that the Democrats' victory in the 2006 elections was due to their anti-war stance.
   

Which of these scenarios is the more probable? While they are not mutually exclusive, I am tempted to say that it is the second (Obama) scenario that would likely motivate any al-Qaeda attacks against US targets (at home or abroad). In other words, an "October surprise" would be to increase war-weariness in America and so cause the more dovish Democratic Party to win the November elections. Certainly, al-Qaeda's success in achieving similar results in Spain in 2004 can only encourage them in this belief.

This issue of perception does raise a difficult problem for the Democratic Party: how does one campaign against the war without raising the hopes of our enemies? It is not easy, and certainly Obama's language on Pakistan and Afghanistan seems to be compensatory tough talk. After all, given the strategic implications of perception, politicians (and, to a lesser extent, the media) are promachoi ("front-fighters") in the overall war. Perception is a powerful weapon, particularly with regard to its deterrent value. Still, it is disconcerting to think that al-Qaeda clearly does not take the Democratic presidential candidate's saber-rattling seriously. Should we?